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Abstract—Near Field Communication (NFC), a short range
wireless technology, has recently experienced a sharp rise in
uptake because of its integration with cell phones. NFC-enabled
cell phones interact with NFC tags to retrieve information in a
single touch. Such tags can be used in variety of applications
like smart posters, product identification, access control etc. The
integrity of the data stored on these tags is assured by digital
signatures. However, this does not guarantee the legitimacy of
tags. They may be replaced with counterfeits. At present the NFC
Forum does not provide any mechanism to detect duplicate tags.
In an offline environment, when there is no shared secret between
the tag and the reader, it is very challenging to differentiate
between legitimate and counterfeit tags.
This paper presents a protocol for the off-line authentication
of NFC tags and provides a framework, based on NFC Forum
specifications, to support the authentication. The proposal is
based on a challenge-response protocol using public key crypto-
graphy and a PKI. In order to make the framework compatible
with existing NFC Forum devices, a new Tag Authentication
Record, designed according to the NFC Data Exchange Format
(NDEF), is introduced. Our proposed framework successfully
differentiates between legitimate and cloned tags which have
sufficient resources to perform the required cryptography.
Keywords–Counterfeit Tag; Off-line Authentication; Near
Field Communication; RFID
I. INTRODUCTION
Near Field Communication (NFC) tags are used to store
data in the format specified by the NFC Data Exchange Format
(NDEF) specification, published by the NFC Forum [1]. The
authenticity of the stored data is guaranteed by a digital
signature which follows the Forum’s Signature Record Type
Definition (Signature RTD) [2]. The signature is computed
over the tag’s contents and is stored in the signature record on
the tag along with the corresponding certificate for verification.
NFC tags are used in a variety of applications like product
identification, smart posters, access control etc. There are
occasions where copying the contents of an NFC tag to another
tag is undesirable. An example of such a scenario is a signed
NFC tag attached to a medicine packet storing its chemical
composition and expiry date. Any NFC Forum device can
read its contents and verify it using the signature. However,
a counterfeit medicine and counterfeit tag with the same data
will also be authenticated. At present, the NFC Forum does
not provide any specification to authenticate the tag. The lack
of such a mechanism opens the door to many security threats,
and particularly to counterfeit products when NFC technology
is used in product identification.
We address this weakness by providing a mechanism based
on the NDEF specification to authenticate NFC tags. The main
advantage of our proposed specification is its compatibility
with existing NFC Forum devices. This contribution to the
NFC framework enables the successful authentication of such
tags along with their data. It adds another layer of defence
to the NFC security framework, making it more secure for
future applications. For a read-only tag, the tag authentication
scheme can simultaneously provide data authentication at no
extra cost whereas the converse is not always true. Therefore
we emphasize that tag authentication is an important security
measure as it provides both tag and data authentication for
read-only tags.
The first part of the paper introduces technical aspects
of Near Field Communication (NFC), including the format
for NFC messages and the digital signature scheme for data
authentication. Next, the types of NFC tags are described,
as the countermeasures for counterfeit tags depend upon the
computational and storage resources available on the tag. After
this, different tag authentication techniques are presented in
relation to NFC technology. In the last part, a new NFC Tag
Authentication Record is proposed that can be used to authenti-
cate at least the tags of NFC Type-4 in an off-line environment,
as well as other tags with sufficient computational power.
II. NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a wireless technology
operating at less than about 4 cm. The main potential of
this technology is its compatibility with contactless smart
cards (ISO/IEC 14443) and radio-frequency identification
(RFID) [3] operating in the 13.56 MHz frequency band.
An NFC link between a tag and a reader is established
by a single touch, making it convenient for users. NFC has
three modes of operation resulting in a variety of applications:
peer-to-peer mode, read/write mode and emulation mode [4].
The availability of NFC technology in cell phones is currently
enhancing the number of its users.
Tags are integrated circuits storing data that can be read by
NFC-enabled devices. In order to maintain the interoperability
of NFC devices and tags, the NFC Forum has specified four
different types of tag [5]:
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Figure 1. NDEF Record Layout ([1], fig. 3)
• Types 1 & 2: These tags are read and re-write capable.
Users can configure the tag to become read-only. Memory
availability is 48 or 96 bytes, expandable to 2 KB.
• Type 3: These tags are based on the Japanese Industrial
Standard (JIS) X 6319-4 known as FeliCa. They are
pre-configured at manufacture to be either read and
rewritable, or read-only. Their memory has a theoretical
limit of 1 MB per service.
• Type 4: These tags are pre-configured at manufacture
to be either read and re-writable, or read-only. There
is up to 32 KBytes of memory available per service.
The Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) based on
ISO/IEC 7816-4 is used for communication between tag
and reader.
III. NFC DATA EXCHANGE FORMAT
The NFC Forum was established in 2004 to standardize
applications which use NFC [6]. Its Data Exchange Format
(NDEF) specification [1] defines a common format and rules
to exchange information in the NFC environment. An NDEF
message contains one or more NDEF records with the structure
shown in Fig. 1. The payload of an NDEF record is described
by its type, length, and an optional identifier. The 3-bit TNF
(Type Name Format) field classifies the content of the Type
field. Its meaning is shown in Table I.
In this paper we require to extend the NFC Forum well-
known type records, for which TNF=1, as our proposed Tag
Authentication Record in §VII-B falls into this category. Each
of the well-known types is identified by its name, identifier
and a character code as allocated by the NFC Forum. The
current list of well-known types is given in Table II.
TABLE I
TYPE NAME FORMAT (TNF) DESCRIPTION (cf [7], TABLE 1)
TNF Meaning
0 An empty record with no payload.
1 An NFC Forum well-known type.
2 A MIME media type identifier (RFC 2406).
3 An absolute URI (RFC 3986).
4 An NFC Forum external type.
5 Used when the type of the payload is unknown.
6 Indicates a chunk record.
7 Reserved for future use.
TABLE II
NFC FORUM WELL-KNOWN TYPES (i.e. TNF=1) [8]
Type Name Type ID Hexadecimal Encoding
Generic Control Gc 0x4763
Text T 0x54
URI U 0x55
Smart Poster Sp 0x5370
Signature Sig 0x536967
IV. TAG AUTHENTICATION SCENARIOS
Since NFC tags can be used in a variety of applications,
the techniques for tag authentication also vary a lot. Tag
authentication can be categorized as follows into two main
categories depending upon the tag’s environment [9].
A. Off-line Authentication
There are occasions when there is no shared secret between
the tag and the reader. Any reader can access the tag and read
its contents. The process of authenticating the tag or the reader
or both in such scenarios is called Off-line authentication.
Normally, it is just the tag that needs to be authenticated. An
NFC smart poster or an NFC tag for product identification
falls into such a category as its contents are accessible to
any reader without the need for a shared secret. Off-line
authentication becomes challenging in an RFID environment
owing to the low computational power of RFID tags. The
typical low cost tag is currently unable to perform any useful
public key cryptography.
B. On-line Authentication
In the On-line category, there is secret information shared
between a tag and the reader as a result of the reader having
access to a server containing a database of secrets. This
scenario is normally applicable in a closed environment like
product identification in supply chain management or access
control. The reader accesses the database to obtain the tag’s
secret and then ascertains whether the tag knows that secret or
not. Since the secret is not accessible to an attacker, a duplicate
tag lacks it and can be detected.
A review of existing tag authentication techniques is avail-
able in [9]. In general, these techniques use on-line servers and
execute a challenge-response protocol to authenticate the tag.
They cannot in general be adapted successfully to the off-line
environment.
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V. TAG AUTHENTICATION
Tag authentication requires a framework that distinguishes
a legitimate tag from a counterfeit tag. The counterfeit may
or may not store the same data as the original. A duplicate
with some alteration in the stored data is obviously a potential
threat to the system. However, there are occasions where
a duplicate with the same data is not desirable either. We
describe such a tag as a cloned tag. Examples of such scenarios
are ePassports [10], product identification, access control etc.
Conversely, there are cases where a cloned tag may be
considered desirable: for example, an NFC tag used as a smart
poster where the integrity of the tag contents is protected by
a Signature record. The more the smart poster is cloned, the
more its contents are advertised.
As observed in Section IV-A, NFC tags may be used
for product identification in an off-line environment. The
information stored in the NFC tag is product specific and
aimed to assist an off-line user to know about the specification
and legitimacy of the attached product. The data on the tag is
protected by the signature record and a valid signature is an
indication of a genuine product. Unfortunately, the same data
can be stored on a duplicate NFC tag affixed to an inferior
product. The signature remains valid as it is the same data as
in the original tag. Since the signature is valid, the user is led
to believe that the product is genuine, whereas it is not. This
happens because the signature specification authenticates only
the stored data on NFC tag. An easy way to avoid such attacks
is to include the tag’s ID in the signature in order to detect a
cloned tag with a different tag ID. But an attacker can affix
to the counterfeit product a programmable tag which returns
the same ID as the original. In this case, the counterfeit is
authenticated as a genuine product with very little investment
by the attacker.
This attack works because the tag is not authenticated along
with its data and a static identifier is used to authenticate the
tag. Lack of any tag authenticating mechanism opens doors
to counterfeit products being accepted as genuine products.
At present, the NFC Forum has not specified any mechanism
to authenticate the tag. In the absence of such a mechanism,
NFC tags based on the NFC Forum specification cannot be
used for secure product identification.
A. Our Contribution
We propose a solution to detect cloned NFC tags used in
an off-line environment. Our solution is formulated within the
NDEF specification and introduces a new Tag Authentication
Record containing parts of a digital certificate. The main
advantage of introducing such a new record is its compatibility
with existing NFC Forum devices. The authentication is then
performed using a challenge-response protocol employing
public key cryptography and a PKI.
VI. EXISTING PROTOCOLS
As observed in Section IV-B, a survey of existing protocols
reveals plenty of techniques for RFID tag authentication in
the on-line environment [9]. Since this paper focuses on
Tag Reader
Initial handshake
Signed NDEF Message
Challenge c
Signature on c
Figure 2. Proposed Tag Authentication Protocol
off-line tag authentication, we now turn to research related
to this domain. Pim Tuyls and Lejla Batina claim the first
tag authentication model in an off-line environment [11].
They used a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) integrated
with the RFID chip (an Integrated PUF or IPUF). In their
model, several fingerprints are derived from the PUF by
sending it multiple challenges and recording the responses.
The challenges and corresponding fingerprints are digitally
signed and printed on the product (if used in the case of supply
chain management). The verifier reads a challenge/response
pair from the data printed on the product or packaging and
sends the challenge to the tag to compute the response. On
receipt, the verifier compares the response with the expected
fingerprint. A successful match authenticates the tag.
The main drawback with this scheme is the limited number
of challenges and corresponding fingerprints available in the
tag’s memory or printed on the product. An attacker can record
all the challenge/response pairs and program another tag with
the same pairs resulting in a successfully cloned tag.
Another anti-cloning approach in the RFID framework,
known as Active Authentication (AA), is used in ePassports
where an RFID tag is used to add more security to an ordinary
passport [12]. This approach uses public key cryptography
where the tag digitally signs the challenge received from the
reader.
Alex Arbit et al. presented a public-key based anti-
counterfeiting system for the Electronic Product Code (EPC)
standard [13]. They implemented a variant of the well-known
Rabin encryption scheme with a 1024-bit key [14].
VII. PROPOSED TAG AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
As noted in Section IV, NFC tags can be used in both on-
line and off-line environments. Our scheme for authenticating
a tag in an off-line environment is based on the Active
Authentication scheme of the ePassport [10] but modified to
fit the NFC architecture. The scheme is applicable to at least
NFC Type-4 tags as these tags are computationally powerful
enough. Such tags satisfy ISO 7816-4 and therefore contain
a cryptographic processor. They can compute asymmetric or
symmetric key encryption [15]. The scheme may be applied to
other tags in future as their computational power increases over
time. Moreover, light-weight versions of public key encryption
schemes may also appear and allow wider applicability. In the
scheme, the tag signs a challenge and the reader verifies the
signed response as shown in Fig. 2.
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The following assumptions are required for the scheme to
work:
• Both the reader and the tag can perform public key
encryption/decryption.
• The memory location where the secret key is stored inside
the tag is not accessible to any reader.
• The reader knows the public verification key for a certi-
ficate held by the tag.
Our scheme differs from the standard methods of authentic-
ation used in smart cards/SIM cards because the latter requires
an on-line environment. A SIM card stores a secret key Ki at
a secure location in the card. The same key is also stored
with the mobile network operator. During authentication,
the network executes a challenge-response protocol to verify
knowledge of Ki by the SIM. A cloned SIM should lack the
key and so would be detected. A similar approach is used
in smart cards issued by banks for monetary transactions.
However, in our context there is no opportunity to share a
secret.
A. The Tag Authentication Digital Certificate
Before describing the protocol, it is useful to define the
public key certificate which it uses and the structure of the
proposed new Tag Authentication record which stores part of
its contents. The certificate requires at least the following six
fields:
1) Protocol Version
2) Challenge Signature Scheme
3) Challenge Public Key
4) Supplementary Text
5) Certificate Signature Algorithm
6) Certificate Signature
The Protocol Version field determines which version of the
Tag Authentication specification is being used. This allows for
future expansion and developments. The Challenge Signature
Scheme field specifies which digital signature algorithm, along
with the relevant parameters, is used by the tag to sign the
challenge, and the Challenge Public Key field stores the public
key information associated with verifying this signature. The
Certificate Signature field is the signature on the records
containing the first four fields, computed using the algorithm
defined by the Certificate Signature Algorithm field. It fol-
lows the NFC Forum signature specification scheme [2]. The
Supplementary Text field has various uses which are described
below.
The certificate might follow the X.509 specification [16],
or a simplification with fewer critical fields. Clearly, it may
be necessary to add further fields in future, such as an expiry
date to deter the illegal re-use of tags. In the case of X.509,
the Extensions field enables the inclusion of the Supplementary
Text. That field also allows the certificate to be restricted to this
NFC application, which is useful because less computationally
extensive cryptography is expected than is normally acceptable
in other situations. We will not consider the encoding of the
certificate any further beyond observing that space is at a
premium on a typical tag. Therefore one would want to reduce,
for example, the twenty or so bytes used for identification of
the signature algorithm in an X.509 certificate to just one byte.
The stored data and data transmitted between tag and reader
is in the format of NDEF records. In order to store the public
key information, we propose a new Tag Authentication record.
The first three certificate fields are to be stored in the payload
field of this record, the Supplementary Text is stored in normal
NFC Forum text records on the tag, and the last two fields are
placed in an NFC signature record.
B. The Tag Authentication Record
The Tag Authentication Record serves two purposes: it
stores the public key information necessary to verify the
signature on a challenge, and its presence is a claim that
the tag is equipped with anti-cloning features. Indeed, such
records should not be allowed in tags without the ability to
enact the authentication protocol. The proposed record follows
the NDEF structure given in Fig. 1 with a TNF value of
1. Its Type should therefore be added to the set of NFC
Forum well-known types, and the type name of ‘Ta’ (for ‘Tag
Authentication’), with hexadecimal encoding 0x5461, added to
the list in Table II. Given the general nature of the construction,
the record may have much wider uses in future, authenticating
other entities than tags. It may therefore make more sense to
call it a Certificate Record with a different type identifier.
C. The Supplementary Text Field
As space is limited on tags, it will often be useful to
have a single signature covering some or all of the message
content in the tag, rather than having separate signatures on the
certificate and the message for users. The Supplementary Text
field enables this to be done by using it for message content.
The signature then ties this content to the particular tag. For
convenience, it is assumed in the implementation details below
that one signature is indeed used to cover both the text message
and the Ta record fields.
In future, the Supplementary Text may have to be structured
into subfields if it is used for several purposes.
D. Protocol Execution Sequence
The scheme is executed in two phases:
1) Initialization Phase. After selecting the version number
and signature scheme, a key pair (KP ,KS) is generated
in a secure way by a trusted party and the secret key
KS is stored inside the tag at a secure location only
accessible to the tag processor for prescribed operations.
The public key KP is stored in the Challenge Public Key
field of the payload of the authentication record. This Ta
record, along with the other records stored on the tag,
is then digitally signed by the same trusted party and
the signature is stored in the signature record on the tag
according to the NFC Forum Signature Specification.
This turns the Tag Authentication record into a signed
digital certificate applicable to NFC tags.
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Figure 3. Verification Process
2) Verification Phase. The verification phase is executed
as follows (see Fig. 3):
• The reader requests and obtains all the data from
the tag. This data is in the form of NDEF records.
• The reader verifies the integrity of the tag’s con-
tents by verifying the signature. A valid signature
indicates that the tag contents are authentic.
• Next, the reader looks for a Tag Authentication
record by searching for record type ‘Ta’. Its absence
indicates that the tag is not protected by the anti-
cloning feature and the Tag Authentication protocol
terminates unsuccessfully.
• Otherwise, the payload of the Tag Authentication
record is extracted and, assuming the reader can
support the required signature scheme, an appropri-
ate challenge c is generated and sent to the tag.
• The tag now uses its secret key KS to compute the
digital signature of c with the specified padding, and
sends the result back to the reader.
• The reader verifies the signature on c using the
public key KP from the certificate. Successful ver-
ification indicates knowledge of the secret key and
hence the legitimacy of the tag, whereas failure
indicates a cloned or damaged tag.
VIII. ANALYSIS
This scheme successfully detects a cloned tag from an
original tag because a cloned tag lacks the secret key KS
corresponding to the public key KP available in the Tag
Authentication record. However, there are several issues that
need to be discussed in detail.
A. Backward Compatibility
The backward compatibility of the tag authenticating proto-
col can be assessed by following two scenarios. We use “plain”
to describe a reader without authenticating ability, and a tag
without authentication response ability.
• An Authenticating reader and a plain tag. In this
case, the reader starts the verification process as shown in
Fig. 3. The plain tag lacks this feature so there should be
no Ta record in its contents. In this case the verification
process stops with the conclusion that the tag cannot be
authenticated. However, if there is a Ta record, then the
plain tag is unable to respond to the challenge. Again the
process terminates with the conclusion that the tag cannot
be authenticated. Since a plain tag should not contain a
Ta record, the reader can reasonably conclude that the tag
is cloned. Notice that this requires that plain tags are not
loaded with a Ta record. As we noted earlier, existence
of the Ta record should be viewed as a claim that the tag
does support the authentication protocol.
• A Plain reader and an authenticatable tag. In this case,
the Ta record is present in the tag but the reader does
not support the tag authentication protocol. Although the
reader recognises the TNF field value 1, the record type
‘Ta’ is unknown to it. According to the NFC Forum spec-
ification [1] §3.2.10, an NDEF parser receiving an NDEF
record with a supported TNF value but an unrecognised
Type field must interpret that record as being of Unknown
type, i.e. TNF=5. So the Ta record is ignored. Thus the
system remains backward compatible in this scenario as
well.
B. Tag Message as a Digital Certificate
It was noted above that the Ta record and the rest of the
tag message can be signed separately, giving two signature
records, or can be signed as one, yielding a single signature
record. The former provides a clean separation between the
tag authentication processes and the message authentication
processes at all levels from signing to verification. However,
the latter binds the message to the specific tag: the message
cannot be ported to another tag because that tag does not know
KS , and will be detected as noted above even on a tag which
does not have authentication capability. This solution also
seems preferable because of restricted space. Respectively,
these two alternatives have interpretations of the Ta record
with its corresponding signature record as a digital certificate
and the whole message as a digital certificate.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses
The strength of our proposed scheme relies on the strength
of the signature scheme, secure location of the secret key
KS inside the tag’s memory and the integrity of the public
certificate verification key Kcert, say, in the reader. The
first is a well matured area of information security, and the
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emergence of elliptic curve cryptography means that at least
the certificate fields on the tag can be signed securely to
yield a fairly short signature. However, the cryptography used
by the tag to sign the challenge will often be fairly weak
because of the low electrical or cryptographic power available
to the tag. One needs to recognise that an attacker can send
numerous challenges to the tag and record the replies and may
therefore be able to break a weak system. The second issue,
the maintained secrecy of KS , depends very much on what
the customer is prepared to pay for the tag, and accessibility
of the tag during its life. Unless the attacker can recover KS ,
he is unable to use the tag’s digital certificate on a clone. It is
indeed easy for an attacker to extract the key from a cheap tag
if it can be taken to a laboratory for further study. Thirdly, if
the integrity of the key Kcert can be compromised, the attacker
can make a successful clone of a tag even when it is protected
by a Ta record. The attacker stores his own secret key K ′S
in the cloned tag and the corresponding public key K ′P is
stored in its Ta record, which the attacker signs. The public
verification key K ′cert corresponding to this signature is then
used to replace the correct key in the reader. Consequently,
the reader believes it has an authentic tag when it verifies the
clone. This results in a successful attack.
In our proposed scheme, the integrity of the Ta record is
assured by digitally signing this record, and perhaps others,
according to the signature specification provided by the NFC
Forum [2]. Recent attacks on signed NDEF records [7] put a
question mark on the integrity of the tag’s contents even if they
are signed. The Ta record can be made inactive in a cloned
tag by changing its TNF value to 5 with some compensating
alteration in the length fields, as mentioned in [7], to preserve
the validity of the signature. Since the TNF and length fields
are not included in the signature, these alterations will not
invalidate the signature. Now the verifier will not execute the
tag authentication protocol since it does not recognise the Ta
record as such. Nevertheless, if the reader is expecting an
authenticatable tag, it should flag this to the operator. (This
referenced vulnerability of the signature specification can be
addressed by adding more fields to the signature as discussed
in [7].)
IX. CONCLUSION
Application of NFC technology to monetary and similar
transactions requires strict adherence to appropriately sound
measures to ensure the necessary high level of security in
the NFC framework. The recently published NFC Forum
Signature Specification provides assurance of data integrity
in NFC tags through the digital signing of NDEF messages.
However, no mechanism is provided by the NFC Forum for
detecting a counterfeit or cloned tag. This results in various
possibilities for malicious activities where a legitimate tag
is replaced by a counterfeit tag and the NFC tag reader is
unable to detect the counterfeit. We proposed a framework
to counter such attacks by providing a tag authenticating
mechanism. It introduces a new Tag Authentication Record
that provides relevant information to authenticate a tag in an
off-line environment. It employs public key cryptography with
digital certificates and so can be used on NFC tags that have
sufficient computational power and resources to perform such
operations. The Tag Authentication Record is based on the
NFC Data Exchange Format and is thus compatible with all
NFC Forum devices. The NFC tag simply signs a challenge c
and returns the signature to the NFC reader. The NFC reader
verifies the signature according to the information available
in the previously communicated Tag Authentication record. A
successful verification confirms that the tag is not cloned.
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